» …weil das Wesen der Technik nichts Technisches ist, darum muss die (…) Auseinandersetzung mit ihr in einem Bereich geschehen, der einerseits mit dem Wesen der Technik verwandt und andererseits doch von ihm grundverschieden ist. Ein solcher Bereich ist die Kunst.« MARTIN HEIDEGGER
Whether today one could still find a majority, which agrees that the purpose of public space is to secure the survival and expansion of democratic cultural forms is up for debate. At the beginning of her essay Agrophobia Rosalyn Deutsche states that there is certainly a consensus over and beyond differences in opinion regarding public space that everything called public should contribute to securing the survival and expansion of democratic culture. In the meantime there is a word of an imminent loss of public sphere – if this process has not already in part begun –, prompting us to ask ourselves which matters, once seen as public, still extend into the realm of privately negotiated interests today. Deutsche describes certain tendencies in public life at the end of the 1990s, when already then, individuals who by recourse to their democratic rights drew attention to changing political practices. Some invoked their living rights and their right to a private sphere and then proceeded to advocate their alleged freedom to relocate the homeless. In hindsight, we can see those tendencies as marking the beginning of a long-term restructuring of the political cultural landscape. Through recourse to a given democratic right it was becoming increasingly possible to enforce demands for radicalized representation of interests on politically legitimate grounds. Political scientist Nancy Fraser speaks of a new phenomenon that is becoming visible as a »pervasive decoupling of cultural and social policy, a policy of difference and a policy of equality«. She explains this development as being a rift of interests, or a new constellation within the social discourse of social justice, which allows one to note a growing attention given to particular interests over and beyond the once generalized demand for redistribution. While advocates of egalitarian redistribution point to global injustice and completely refute a policy of identity, their opponents see an animosity towards minorities and a lack of differentiation in the political objective of redistribution. Rosalyn Deutsche was quick to recognize possible connections between a politics of recognition that was emerging and political strategies of social marginalization in public space. However, instead of participating solely in this polarizing debate, she focuses on the question whether and how the concept of space can be understood in a political sense. In the realm of political theory she is referring to the theories of public space put forward by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe and addresses a concrete theory of space. Laclau and Mouffe assume that each system (meaning) – be it discourse, identity, space – delineates itself from a given outside (non-meaning). This outside is not part of the system of meaning and it also prevents it from completely stabilizing itself in the sense of a totalizing meaning. As a spatial structure this system is subject to certain effects, which in turn define a temporal phenomenon. In the sense of temporal structural changes, Laclau speaks of dislocations. If the system is able to spatialize itself vis-à-vis the heterogeneous outside (process of symbolization), that is, to reduce temporal effects, meaning is able to emerge. In this connection Laclau and Mouffe refer to necessary practices that only
as a repeating articulation connect elements with each other and open up a temporary space. Space is thus the result of a temporary »political articulation which in the long term must by necessity always fail«. For the realization of
democracy with its public places, Deutsche recommends abandoning the positivist idea that social life is has a substantial basis.
»But when public space is represented as an organic unity that the homeless person is seen to disrupt from the outside, the homeless becomes a positive embodiment of the element that prevents society from achieving closure.«
There is a necessary
relatedness between the person who disturbs and the person who feels disturbed. If the disturbing person did not exist, the latter would only be referring to him/herself. The inversion of such a relation would imply a closure, which would make any articulatory practice impossible. Precisely those who proportionately represent the social outside ultimately provide the essential dislocations in the definition of the system »society«. Deutsche thus succeeds in stressing the social relatedness in terms of its value and as crucial condition for preventing social aspirations for comprehensive identity. By foregrounding the theoretical model of social organization in her reflections she develops a different take on public space. To critics who demand a greater measure of homogeneity for public space, which in her view is more geared to social discourse, she responds by noting that public space does not yield to any positivist basic assumption and that there are no absolute functions to legitimize political demands for constraining conditions.
»However much the democratic public sphere promises openness and accessibility, it can never be fully inclusive or fully constituted political community. It is, from the start, a strategy of distinction, dependent on constitutive exclusions, the attempt to place something outside. Conflict, division, and instability, then, do not ruin the democratic public sphere; they are conditions of its existence.«
In current discussions in which is debated whether we have to worry about private matters in light of the growing digital infrastructure one often risks losing sight of another important aspect.
»Wenn wir dem Wort ›privat‹ nicht mehr anhören, dass es ursprünglich einen Zustand der Beraubung kennzeichnet, so auch darum, weil der neuzeitliche Individualismus eine so enorme Bereicherung der Privatsphäre mit sich gebracht hat. Wesentlicher für unser Verständnis des Privaten ist aber, dass es sich nicht nur wie im Altertum von dem Öffentlichen, sondern vor allem auch von dem Gesellschaftlichen abhebt, das die Antike nicht kannte und dessen Inhalt für sie in die Sphäre des Privaten fiel. Entscheidend für die Züge, die das Private in der Neuzeit angenommen hat, entscheidend vor allem für seine wichtigste Funktion: Intimität zu gewährleisten, ist, dass es historisch im Gegensatz nicht zum Politischen, sondern zum Gesellschaftlichen entdeckt wurde, zu welchem es darum auch in einer engeren und wesentlicheren Beziehung steht.«
In her book Vita activa Hannah Arendt refers to a frequent misunderstanding where the political is equated with the social – a misunderstanding that extends back to antiquity. The social yielded to the societal in that the zoon politicon was translated in Greek as a political being, on that was thus capable of action, and in Latin as animal sociale. As Arendt argues, in the Greek understanding the Social stood for a dimension shared with all other living beings – namely that of »natural coexistence« while political organization was deemed as being a purely human competence, the focus of which was the house. The emergence of the political polis created the spatial field of reference for political activities and conceded the individual a further, namely political identity.
»Von den Tätigkeiten, die in allen Formen menschlichen Zusammenlebens anzutreffen sind, galten nur zwei als eigentlich politisch, nämlich Handeln und Reden. Und nur sie begründen jenen Bereich menschlicher Angelegenheiten, (…) aus dem gerade alles nur Notwendige oder auch Nützliche ausgeschlossen war.«
The successful avoiding of force or violence became an expression of the immanently Political in the Greek polis. According to Arendt, such experiential spaces in which speech dominates are located outside of the natural realm of human coexistence, that is, outside of the private-societal realm. Political rulers could be distinguished from the Greek head of the oikos primarily by virtue of the fact that absolute and indisputable power was never adjudged to the former in political matters, while a pater familias was actually allowed to arbitrarily rule over his family and slaves. The societal space only emerged in the modern age, as Arendt explains, and found its form in the nation state. And »the larger the population of the given politically constituted communities becomes, the more likely it is that the societal and not the political element will assume priority within the public realm.« It thus becomes clear why the originally clear distinction between the private and the public has become blurred for us today. While in causal terms, the economic and societal realms were to be found on the private side, they were thus identified as being non-political. If they are on the public side, then the originally clear distinction between the private and the public realm seems completely suspended.
»Der Raum des Gesellschaftlichen entstand, als das Innere des Haushalts mit den ihm zugehörigen Tätigkeiten, Sorgen, Organisationsformen aus dem Dunkel des Hauses in das volle Licht des öffentlich politischen Bereichs trat. Damit war nicht nur die alte Scheidelinie zwischen privaten und öffentlichen Angelegenheiten verwischt, sondern der Sinn dieser Begriffe wie die Bedeutung, die eine jede der beiden Sphären für das Leben des Einzelnen als Privatmensch und als Bürger eines Gemeinwesens hatte, veränderten sich bis zur Unkenntlichkeit.«
Arendt addresses something that is symptomatic for modernity, namely the lacking protective sphere of the private that was once separated from the political which is
why it has become possible for society to demand conformity from its members. In modern society no one seems to rule any more, or to paraphrase Arendt: what now reigns is the »uniformity of societal interest.« Decades later Rosalyn Deutsche described this phenomenon as follows:
»With the democratic revolution, however, state power was no longer referred to as an external force. Now it is derived from »the people« and was located inside the social. But with the disappearance of references to an outside origin of power, an unconditional origin of social unity vanished as well. The people are the source of power but they, too, are deprived in the democratic moment of their substantial identity. Like the state, the social order, too, has no basis.«
Referring to the philosopher Claude Lefort, Deutsche moves closer to his definition of a vacant space. According to Lefort democratic systems have trouble, symbolically transferring power to their members. The »image of an empty place« coined by Lefort describes a democracy that negates a reference to negative power, ascribing it instead to society. The backing of authority so decisive for exercising power cannot be located in the defined meanings of the Social. Power is exercised by the options of negotiating and temporarily legitimizing acts. For Lefort this backing by authority assumes functions that serve to constitute and stabilize social order.
»The public space, in Lefort’s account, is the social space where, in the absence of a foundation, the meaning and unity of the social is negotiated – at once constituted and put at risk. What is recognized in public space is the legitimacy of debate about what is legitimate and what is illegitimate.«
What Deutsche finds particularly interesting is Lefort’s reading of public space. According to Lefort, public space becomes a predestined locus for negotiating meaning and temporarily unifying the social. For him the process of the temporary spatialization of the social is decisive. Referring to the alluded power vacuum in democracies, Hannah Arendt warns underestimating society in its striving for conformity. Similar to her original model of the family, she sees society as largely excluding »action« and replaces it with forms of »conduct« with the goal of streamlining its members and making them more conducive to social life. The theory of space put forward by Laclau and Mouffe, which Deutsche addresses, could possibly help us to understand the inner impulse which drives even democratically geared systems to promote conformity. This tendency is seen in political theory as being the system-immanent tendency of each system of meaning to attain absolute, all-encompassing identity. At the same time the systems are dependent on the outside that constitutes them, and their self-contained totality, as space without an outside is not attainable, since as a spatial structure it is subject to the ontological principle of dislocation. Dislocation and temporality thus make the closer of society as a self-contained space impossible. Only when various interests are articulated in an ongoing way can a political space be temporarily constructed. Arendt proceeds to address the system-specific demand for all-encompassing identity, but at the same time she has doubts about the power of dislocating effects, especially since the boundaries between the political and the social-political, which could once be clearly delineated, have become lost and modern society has subsequently not succeeded in developing an awareness for its outside. She thus counters the logic of descriptive theories with the seemingly uncanny option of a society that indeed may become possible.
Scopes of action
After it has become clear what meaning public space assumes in issues related to social organization, it seems important to
analyze aspects of the relationship between the individual and the public sphere. In his book Public and Private Spaces of the City, Ali Madanipour succeeds in clearly describing the relation of our body to public space. The principle of Cartesian dualism makes a clear distinction between the inner, psychic world and the external, objective world, implying that the human body must also be perceived as such a boundary. At the end of the 19th century Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, used elaborate procedures to study conscious and unconscious contents as well as the conflicts between them. He opposed the classical notion of a pure mind detached from the body. The relatedness between body and mind that he proposed at the time made it possible to study the influences of the body on the mind. For the individual mental contents are diverse, contradictory and transparent. They show how little logical and rational the relationships between the inner world of the psyche/mind and the outer world are and how pre-linguistic and thus conflicting they are in substance. The human body, belonging to both the inner and the outer realm, thus assumes a dual role: it constitutes and contains our conscious being, but in the outer world it also represents but one object among many. This leads Madanipour to the question as to the autonomy of the individual, the individual self. Referring to the age of Enlightenment, he describes the birth of the self-responsible individual as the introduction of an individual being as unity, which controls both mind and body and is based on personal knowledge and will. In this case the subject is identical with its mind/psyche and develops the privileged gaze in the first person (authority). In the course of psychoanalytic studies in the 20th century, this view lost its legitimacy. In the subsequent considerations of structuralism and post-structuralism, space becomes a social construction. It is no longer seen as pre-given but rather as representing the results of social, economic and political processes. Thus individual speech is dependent on a given system of linguistic meaning and the position of the author of what is spoken is ascribed more to social structures and systems than individual actors. Finally the social sciences also came to the conclusion that individual action is limited and shaped by the power of the social. In this sense the public sphere has priority over the individual whose autonomy is seen as illusory in society but also through mental states and processes of thought. Ali Madanipour recommends questioning »the idealized idea of the individual« as is still propagated primarily in western societies and »seeing its fragmented, incoherent reality« to a greater extent. It is only through the interaction between both realms that people can become what they are. From the »1st person perspective« individuals meet, exchange ideas and thus constitute an »inter-subjective sphere« that is entirely reserved for itself. At the same time he points out the actual relevance of practical and political action as he locates all action at the intersection of the Biological and the Social, where pre-linguistic and linguistic contents become combined. Only by means of interlacing both one gains the ability to relate the inner self to the outer world. In »the 1st person view« subjects meet and exchange while producing an »inter-subjective sphere« which he calls public space. In this view one experiences space subjectively may it be of public or private nature. In contrast, due to »the 3rd person view« one is able to come to a conclusion after going through a process of observation and comparison, as the individual consciousness becomes shaped by publically accessible language and culture. Even though the public blends with the private in a hardly distinguishable way, none of the two realms loses values, since both represent deviating structural dimensions with regard to the respective definitions and developments of the individual. In her 1976 article Video: The Aesthetics of Narcissism, Rosalind Kraus ascribed a symbolic mirror function to the TV monitor. Since the viewer is able to interact with him/herself through the integrated video feedback loop, the monitor becomes the reflection perceived in the mirror. She equates the impact of reflection with a procedure of appropriation in the sense that by means of illusion differences between subject and object appear to vanish. In psychoanalysis the similar exclusion of objects, which can also be described as the negation of the other, is referred to as narcissistically motivated behavior. From a psychoanalytical perspective, humans by nature carry aggressive and destructive forces in themselves, which if they do not make careful use of them can lead to mental illness. The individual learns to affirm and to negate, to pose questions and to make careful, unbiased judgments. Each individual is dependent on a social life within a group, which sets moral standards that must be followed to guarantee common survival. At very young age, an important adaptation process is initiated via a purely external, paternal care. In the course of becoming an adult the individual learns social demands and internalizes them. The individual develops a social consciousness, which allows it to act largely according to the internalized system of collective values.
»Thus civilization gains control of the dangerous desire of the individual for aggression by weakening and disarming the individual and placing him/her in an intermediary position for observation. Like the garrison in a conquered city.«
Deviations in behavior are to be understood as the consequence of social, unprocessed tensions. If the individual perceives the interests of others, which clash with his/her own, and cannot find any room for negotiation, then this leads to continuing physical-psychical states of tensions and has a lasting negative impact on the individual’s development of social expertise and critical curiosity. All public spheres of divided interests and concerns offer enormous potential for
the development of individual skills. The existence of urban space for the adaptation and negotiation of public concerns enables city dwellers to expand their individual skills in a responsible way and can even contribute to a heightened quality of public life. If a society is based mainly on conformity as a means of top-down regulation, then the reproduction of critical egos can for the most part be completely ruled out. This form of regulation – like the upbringing of children – would instead
imply for adults a lifelong process of cultural adaptation, guided by external authorities,
which would have to engage in a continuous power struggle with their drive-driven counterparts. Psychoanalyst and writer Alexander Mitscherlich radically criticized the off-putting appearance of German cities in the 1960s. He saw himself as a strong advocate of an urban planning which was optimistic about the complex struggles of individuals to make a contribution in the sense of support in a spatial sense. For him urban spaces had a strengthening or weakening effect on the ego of individuals. His concern was primarily collective responsibility, i.e., to help the individual overcome all difficulties so that he/she could feel sufficiently independent on the inside and capable of assessing and judging social behavior. In this context I would like to recall categories of behavior originally presented by Michel de Certeau in his book The Practice of Everyday Life. He defines two modes of behavior in urban contexts, on the one hand, »strategies« and on the other hand, »tactics«. Strategies are primarily developed by institutions and power centers; they produce certain products to be able to secure as large an impact as possible by means of their effects. Tactics, by contrast, are increasingly used by individuals as »non-producing« actors to partially negotiate given strategies. The city layout, the signs on streets and squares or the traffic order, for instance, embody strategies of an elected municipal government, of companies or committees. In contrast to this, shortened routes, apart from given paths, the aimless wandering as well as the ritually motivated movements through urban space can be described as tactics. Even though according to this definition, individuals cannot carry out any structural changes, tactics enable forms of temporary adaptation to the environment, and do justice to alternating, individual needs – »The tactic manifests itself not in its products but in its methodology.« De Certeau emphasizes the operational dimension of tactics that enables individuals to evade the immediate influence of strategically geared spaces. According to De Certeau this type of tactic action allows corresponding activities to become plausible forms of subversion. He sees the temporary becoming invisible of space of action as being grounded primarily in unconsciously motivated wishes to make things such as spaces »inhabitable« at least in mind. Today strategy and tactic are often directly perceived as being in an interactive relationship with each other, through which some of their basic characteristics experience a contrary orientation. Media firms such as Facebook ask their users to write program extensions so as to be able to then offer them as new services. It still seems to be unclear how creative producers will act when parts of the electronics industry (by means of products along with service catalogues that are on the market), media corporations or even network machines, actively start to shape cultural services. The production of particular, electronic publics raises the question as to how various interpretations of the public can be documented and assessed today. As representative of the deluge of user-generated information in the network – unimagined until a few years ago – there is a growing interest in the so-called social media. The related software packages mainly serve to promote communication aw well as more intense cooperation in the Internet, and are called Web 2.0.
»Social software are those applications that support information, identity and -relation management in the (sub) publics of hyper-textual and social networks.«
Given the availability of new, interactive as well as collaborative elements, Web 2.0 has for several years often served as a -projection surface for wishful thinking, i.e., to be able to provide for new possibilities of participation in the Internet through improved communication tools. Social networks are fed by ways of how information and communication channels enable extensive, faster and more inexpensive coordination of activities that are characteristic both of business and of politics. Via the creation of self-organized interest groups one hopes to be able to heighten democratic awareness, and to establish an atmosphere of social trust in the sense of cultural convergences to be shared in the -Internet. Independent of academic background and individual profile by now it is possible to provide and use texts, -images, audio and video material, software, data, discussions, transactions, brand names and links. This development allows us to observe a sort of rededication of the network sphere: -whereas in the 1990s the attention was focused more on professional -contents, there has been
a shift in this interest since about the mid-2000s towards non-professional contents. The Internet has become transformed from a medium for publications to a medium for communication. Self-organization and participation appear to basic principles of new electronic public spheres.
Technological public spheres
In view of the fact that global computer-based networks as well as the accompanying digitalization is seen as the latest technological innovation, the sociologist Saskia Sassen asks how in the long term users will react to these conditions:
»How will technologies with this enormous potential of diffusion actually be used – sometimes with different goals? They can be used to both democratize and concentrate power. High finance, but also civic social organizations, which realize the implications of democracy and participation utilize the diffusion potential of these technologies.«
Sassen illustrates the potential of digital network technologies by referring to the different effects which are already triggered under parallel conditions as for instance those in financial and civic social organizations. She suggests grasping interactive, electronic domains, beyond the technical preconditions, as ecologies, which allow non-technological variables to be introduced. Whereas in the global financial and capital market this has led to sophisticated forms of control and concentration of capital flows, in activist networks the same characteristics contributed to favorable distribution results. Since portable, readily available, location-sensitive and connected apparatus converges with social practices, technologies have become increasingly useful for both groups and individuals. New technologies of communication and computation produce organizational forms such as ›smart mobs‹ which in part are the result of the customs//habits of years of trusting cooperation.
»This is politics which (…) in part are embedded in non-digital settings, shapes an event, gives it meaning and to a certain extent even creates it. This form of activism contributes to the beginning unbundling of the exclusive and also symbolic authority over territory and individual who for a long time we associated with the nation state.«
According to Sassen this development has created a conceptual and empirical space for the production of informal, non-institutionalized knowledge. This knowledge is based on a system that is shaped by decentralized approaches, a high degree of interactivity and simultaneity. She describes a new phenomenon of layer-ecologies, by means of which technical characteristics are mobilized. Causally coherent bodies of knowledge, which historically were administered by self-contained institutions are deconstructed and distributed as
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smaller, singular units of knowledge throughout diverse institutional systems of order. Subsequently, they produce new conditions on political, economic, technical, cultural and subjective levels. As we learn more and more about the logic and dynamic of electronic network technologies, we have the possibility to integrate the empirical results of socially created logics in various domains. Today, location specific, networked computer chips are distributed throughout buildings,
as well as in clothing and represent the irrevocable fusion of materialized and virtual realities. By means of participating in trans-boundary public spheres especially local interest groups achieve possibilities to gain attention beyond regional space politics. In planning procedures infrastructure has been primarily dealt with as pre-given technological framework with accompanying implied functions. After many years of experience with digital technology, planers increasingly have come to acknowledge new paradigms of function and use based on the nature of digital technology. Sassen notes, Open Source has not only technical but also social consequences. Both the forms of interaction but also the general respect for a common space are shaped in a lasting way by new knowledge practices. According to her, soon we will be able to introduce empirical output of socially motivated logics into these digital domains to gain new experiences and explore unknown opportunities. As part of our Public Space 2.0 research process, the wearable artifact allows to put a light on basic design functionalities within the ongoing socio-political process of spatial transformation.
 Transl.: »Since the essence of technology is nothing technical, an exploration of it must (…) take place in an area that is related to the essence of technology but at the same time very different from it. Such an area is art.«
 Deutsche, Rosalyn. »Agoraphobia«, in Evictions. Art and Spatial Politics, First MIT Press paperback edition, 1998. p. 269
 Evictions, 1998. pp. 272–275
 Fraser, N., Honneth, A. Umverteilung oder Anerkennung? Eine politisch-philosophische Kontroverse. Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 2003. p. 16
 Laclau, E., Mouffe, C.. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. trans. Winston Moore and Paul Cammack, London: Verso, 1985. p. 122
 Evictions, 1998. p. 278
 Evictions, 1998. p. 289
 Arendt, Hannah. Vita activa oder Vom tätigen Leben. Piper Verlag München, (1967) 2002. p. 48. Transl.: »If we are no longer able to sense that the word ›private‹ originally described a state of divestment, it is also because modern individualism has entailed such an enormous enrichment of the
private sphere. More important for our understanding of the private is, however, that it does not just stand out from the public, as in antiquity, but first and foremost from the social, which was not known in ancient times, and for which social contents fell into the private sphere. What is decisive for the characteristics that the private assumed in the modern age and above all for its most important function – to guarantee intimacy – is that historically it was discovered in opposition not to the political but to the social, to which it thus stands in a much more intimate and significant relationship.«
 Vita activa, 2002. pp. 34/35. Transl.: »Of the activities that can be found in all forms of human coexistence only two were actually seen as political, namely action and speaking. And only they are constitutive for the realm of human matters (….) from which precisely everything that is only necessary or even useful was excluded.«
 Vita activa, 2002. p. 35
 Vita activa, 2002. p. 38
 Vita activa, 2002. p. 54
 Vita activa, 2002. p. 48. Transl.: »The space of the Societal emerged as the inside of the household along with the related activities, concerns, forms of organization, emerged from the darkness of the house to the total lightness of the public political realm. Thus the old boundary line between private and public matters not only became blurred, but also the sense of these concepts as well as the meaning that each of these two spheres had for the life of the individual both as a private person and a citizen of a community had, changed beyond recognition.«
 Evictions, 1998. p. 273
 Evictions, 1998. p. 274
 Vita activa, 2002. p. 51
 Laclau, Ernesto. New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time. London-New York: Verso, 1990. p. 141
 Madanipour, Ali. Public and Private Spaces of the City, Routledge, New York, 2003. p.11
 Freud, Sigmund. Civilization and its Discontents, W.W. Norton&Company, Inc., New York, 1961. p. 13
 Public and Private Spaces, 2003. p.14
Public and Private Spaces, 2003. p. 16
 Public and Private Spaces, 2003. p. 17
 Krauss, Rosalind. »Video: The Aesthetics of Narcissism«, in October / Vol.1. MIT Press, 1976. p. 50–64
 Civilization and its Discontents, 1961. p. 84
 Mitscherlich, Alexander. Die Unwirtlichkeit unserer Städte. Anstiftung zum Unfrieden. Suhrkamp Verlag. Frankfurt a. Main, 1965. p.153
 Certeau, Michel de. The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. p. 23
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Practice_of_Everyday_Life (Accessed on: 05/01/2012)
 Schmidt, Jan. Social Software: Online-gestütztes Informations-, Identitäts- und Beziehungsmanagement. Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen, Nr.2/2006. pp. 37–46
 Chan, Adrian. »Social Media: Paradigm shift?« http://www.gravity7.com/paradigm_shift_1.html (Accessed on: 04/30/2012)
 Sassen, Saskia. Informal Knowledge and it’s Enablements: The Role of the new Technologies, 2010. http://future-nonstop.org/c/f7b7089f10dec03d5e8a5cf8d9f8dad2 (Accessed on: 04/30/2012)
 Rheingold, Howard. Smart mobs. The next social revolution, Basic Books, Perseurs Book Groups, Cambridge, 2002. pp.161
 Sassen, Saskia. Networked. How the Internet is changing our Societies. 2010. http://www.milkeninstitute.org/pdf/forum_990921.pdf (Accessed on: 04/30/2012)